Darius III and his Generalship

Throughout much of history, Alexander has been seen as the great conqueror of the mighty Persian Empire, a uniter of men, and superb military genius. Juxtaposed to this glorious figure is Alexander’s Persian counterpart, Darius III. The majority of both ancient and contemporary historians have looked down upon the final Achaemenid king. He has been described as cowardly, inept, and foolish, both as a king and as a military commander. One of the chief ancient sources, Arrian, describes Darius as “the feeblest and most incompetent of men” (185). Many modern historians are influenced by this overtly negative bias against Darius, and consequently make their own negative judgments about him. W. W. Tarn, for example, proclaims Alexander’s foe as a “poor despot, cowardly and inefficient” (1.58). These sentiments are exemplary of the general attitudes that have existed throughout history toward Darius III.

Are these negative sentiments, however, accurate, or are they the result of propaganda campaigns intended to glorify the name of Alexander, and slander the reputations of his foes, especially Darius III? Several studies have been published in recent years that have focused on the figure of Darius III. These studies attempt to unveil an accurate portrayal of Darius, free of the biases that previous works have shown. One facet of Darius’ life that is being portrayed in a much more accurate manner is his generalship. In the past, Darius has been ridiculed for being an extremely incompetent general on the battlefield, experiencing great losses at Issus and Guagamela, despite his numerical superiority. Detailed scholarship, however, is revealing a different side to Darius’s military strategies that history has seemingly neglected to report.

The first major pitched battle between the Persian army and Alexander’s army occurred at the Granicus River, situated in the northwestern region of Asia Minor, in 334 B.C. Although Darius was not present at the battle, he undoubtedly played a large role in the preparations for it. The ancient sources describe a council of Persian generals that preceded their deployment at the Granicus. Memnon, the Rhodian general who was not only in charge of the Greek mercenary contingency in the Persian army, but was also a member of the ruling class in the Persian aristocracy, gave a strong argument for delaying a confrontation with Alexander. Instead, he proposed to burn the resources in that region of Asia Minor, which possibly could have forced Alexander to leave the region unscathed in order to attain the necessary resources for his soldiers. A Persian satrap, Arsites, strongly rebutted this plan, stating that “he would not consent to the destruction by fire of a single house belonging to any of his subjects” (Arrian 69). The other Persian generals present strongly agreed with Arsites’ sentiment, and decided to deploy their troops along the banks of the Granicus River, where they were defeated by Alexander and his army.

The tactics of the battle are not relevant since Darius was absent from all of the proceedings surrounding the event. Unfortunately, the ancient sources are completely silent in regards to the location of Darius, and the reason why he is not present at either the council or the battle itself. One possible explanation is that Darius was busy raising an army from his home base in central Persia. Upon learning of Alexander’s crossing of the Hellespont, he may have commanded his satraps and generals in Asia Minor to raise an army from their own lands to confront Alexander. Darius may have thus left the tactical planning to his generals, which would explain the calling of the war council at Zeleia

Many critics of Darius have called his decision to reject the advice of Memnon unwise and rash. Briant, however, provides a very convincing theory that seemingly releases Darius from fault (2002: 821-823). The ancient sources, especially Diodorus, highlight the advice of Memnon as very sound and intelligent. One must remember though that Memnon was just one man among many generals and satraps taking part in the war council. The Greek historians may have excessively emphasized his prominence because he was himself Greek, and thus, according to ancient Greek sentiments, was superior to the Persians. The truth may be that while Memnon’s advice was considered, albeit briefly, the military strategy of the Persians in Asia Minor may have already been decided beforehand. Briant proposes that Darius had already given his orders to attack Alexander to his generals, and the council was held only to decide the location of and the manner in which the encounter should occur. If this were the case, Arsites and the other Persian generals would have quickly disregarded Memnon’s advice and instead focus their attention on how to best approach the inevitable encounter with Alexander. The ancient historians overly emphasized Memnon’s importance in the council, and when this is couple with the hindsight the historians possessed, one can see how many scholars, both ancient and contemporary, would fault Darius for employing the wrong strategy in response to Alexander’s arrival in Asia.

Darius’ next move was to appoint his Greek general, Memnon, who had survived the engagement at the Granicus River, as commander of the entire Persian fleet (Arrian 84). Alexander, after the capture of Miletus, disbanded the bulk of his naval fleet, possibly because he expected to capture the essential naval bases lying along the Carian, Lycian, Pamphylian, and Cilician coastline, negating the necessity for a strong fleet (Diodorus XVII.23.1). Darius appointed Memnon as commander of the Persian fleet in the hopes of recapturing the coastal settlements in southern Asia Minor that Alexander successfully captured in 333. If Memnon was successful in capturing these settlements, Alexander may have had a large problem on his hands. His ties to Europe would have been cut, leaving him and his army devoid of the essential resources that were coming in from the Hellespont regions. Some scholars believe that the death of Memnon in 333, during his naval siege of Mytilene, was the cause of the eventual demise of the Persian fleet. However, Memnon had appointed two men to take over his command before he died: Pharnabazus and Autophradates (Arrian 101). These men were even able to capture Mytilene after Memnon’s death. Alexander did seem to be quite concerned with the Persian fleet, since he did commission the creation of a new fleet to combat it (Arrian 103). Even this new fleet, however, did not seem to disturb Persia’s naval superiority (Briant 2002: 827). Instead, the main cause of the demise of the Persian fleet seems to stem from the fact that Darius recalled many of the mercenaries in the navy to serve in his land army as a response to Alexander’s reinforcements and his increasing speed toward the Phoenician coast. Darius did not merely give up on his naval campaign. It seems that he was rather planning on attacking Alexander with both a naval and a land contingency. However, Alexander’s speedy march through Caria and Lycia forced Darius to change this plan. Since Darius did not have enough time to recruit troops from the Eastern provinces of his empire, he was forced to recall a large number of soldiers from his navy (Curtius 3.8.1). Quick, necessary adjustments such as this are not emphasized by the ancient historians, but are rather hinted at, only to be drawn out by modern historians.

Darius’ following actions preceding the Battle of Issus have drawn additional ire from both ancient and modern historians. Once he received the additional troops from his fleet, Darius traveled west and encamped at Sochi, a settlement in the Amik Plain, just east of the Amanus mountain range. He sent most of his baggage train south to Damascus, signifying that Darius meant to engage Alexander in battle at that location. Fighting the upcoming battle in the open fields surrounding Sochi would allow Darius to utilize his strong cavalry units to flank and disrupt the Macedonian lines. Upon learning this, Alexander traveled east through the town of Mallus, around the Gulf of Issus, and then south through the Pillar of Jonah. Just south of this area, Alexander stopped his army at the settlement of Myriandrus. The ancient sources are inconclusive in regards to the reasons of his delay, but Alexander and his army encamped themselves just west of the Belen Pass, the southernmost pass through the Amanus range, through which the Persian Royal Road passes (Bosworth 56-59).

At this point, the two armies were at a standstill. Alexander was waiting along the Phoenician coast, hoping to hold the battle in the narrow coastal defiles. Darius was encamped in the fields of the Amik Plain, hoping to lure the Macedonian king into battle there. The next move would prove to be a decisive one that could have possibly decided Alexander’s entire campaign against the Persians. Eventually, it was Darius who decided to move first. He marched his army north through the Bahçe Pass, circled around the Amanus range, then traveled south along the coast before stopping along the northern banks of the Pinarus River. Immediately, Darius’ decision to move away from the wide-open plains surrounding Sochi comes into question. In the narrow coastal defiles, the advantages of the Persian cavalry would be negated, as there would be insufficient land for the horses to maneuver and flank the Macedonian troops. Knowing this, why would Darius decide to march his army north and into the rear of Alexander’s army along narrow coastal lands of Phoenicia? Two very probable theories have been proposed. First, with winter approaching quickly, resources were quickly being depleted. Because that year’s harvest was long completed, Darius would either need to retreat back to Babylon with his army for the winter, which would have consequently surrendered Phoenicia to Alexander, or Darius could make the first move and initiate the battle. Darius chose the latter option, since Alexander would have virtually limitless resources if he were to capture all of the coastal settlements in the region (Devine 1985b: 33; Bosworth 59).

Another explanation of Darius’ decision to abandon his camp in Sochi involves the splitting of Alexander’s army (Murison 420). At one point, Alexander sent Parmenio with a considerable amount of troops to capture the city of Issus and remove any Persians in the region (Curtius 3.7.6). When Darius learned that Alexander’s army was split into two, he hastily marched his men night and day into Cilicia, hoping to cut off the two battalions from one another (Plutarch 329). Unfortunately for the Persian king, Alexander had just as hastily marched his army south down the coastline, believing Darius to still be in the plains near Sochi. Darius did not realize that his plan had failed until he came across the wounded and sick Greek soldiers left behind at Issus (Arrian 111). He mutilated these Greeks, perhaps out of frustration, and decided to position his men on the northern banks of the Pinarus River, awaiting the eventual arrival of Alexander.

Both theories are very probable, as they would explain the otherwise inexplicable movement of Darius from a very advantageous battlefield to one that negates an essential component of his army. Despite this fact, however, Darius was still in a viable position. He was positioned in Alexander’s rear, who did not believe reports that Darius was behind him until he sent his own scouts to witness the Persian army themselves. Darius was also able to set up a strong defensive position, creating a sort of abatis to defend a portion of their riverbanks. His preparations for the oncoming Macedonian army were very sound, lacking any tactical errors.

The numerically superior Persian army was set up in a manner that seemed to depend on the success of their Greek mercenaries, who were positioned near the center of the frontlines. On his flanks, Darius utilized combinations of light infantry and cavalry units. If the Greeks were able to hold their opponents, the Persian cavalry may have been able to flank the Macedonian units, leading to a Persian victory. Unfortunately for Darius, the Persian army’s loss was not a result of inadequate or poor planning on his part. Rather, it was caused by the inexperience of his troops, and the ingenious tactics of his foe, Alexander. Darius’ horsemen were seemingly overwhelmed by the Thessalian and Companion cavalries under Alexander’s direction. Instead, Alexander’s cavalries were able to penetrate into the rear of Darius’ army, causing both the Great King and his remaining troops to rout. Though Darius escaped with his life, many Persians did not. As a result, Alexander was able to systematically capture the entirety of Phoenicia, creating a very strong Macedonian foothold in Asia (Devine 1985a: 49-57).

Not all of the Persian troops present at Issus were decimated. On the contrary, it seems that several generals of Darius, including Amyntas, a Macedonian exile, raised reinforcements and resumed military operations in Asia Minor, on the orders of Darius (Briant 2002: 828-829). Though most of the attempts to recapture settlements were thwarted by the new Lydian governor, Antigonus, this very minute detail portrays an essential detail in Darius strategy. Despite his setback at Issus, he still meant to isolate Alexander in Asia by cutting off his lines to Europe. If the campaigns had been successful, Alexander may have been forced to return to Asia Minor, delaying his advance into the interior of Persia. This extra time would have given Darius the opportunity not only to raise more troops from the fringes of his empire, but also to adequately train them for the inevitable battles against the army of Alexander. However, Darius’ generals were defeated, and Darius was forced to prepare for a grand pitched battle to be unlike any other.

After his defeat at Issus, Darius returned to Babylon and raised a nearly entirely new army. There were very few Greek mercenaries left in his army by this point. Instead, Darius relied heavily on soldiers from his eastern satrapies, including elephants, who may be making their first appearance in a Western battle here (Badian 2000: 258). He also trained his soldiers in a Macedonian fashion, equipping them with sturdy sarissa-like weapons, evident in later piece of art (Badian 1999: 80). Darius learned the importance of the terrain of the battlefield as well. In the weeks leading up to the battle, Darius chose the rocky plains of Guagamela, near the town of Arbela, as his battleground. In an effort to ensure success for the 200 scythe-chariots in Darius’ army, he ordered that the field be cleared of the rocks and boulders that could have possibly hindered them (Devine 1986: 102). The Persian army swelled to about 75,000 soldiers in total, including 25,000 horsemen (Devine 1986: 103). Compared to Macedonian army which comprised of 40,000 infantrymen and only 7,000 cavalrymen, the Persians held a very large advantage leading up to the battle (Arrian 167).

Again, however, Darius’ army was defeated. A major reason is probably due to Darius’ own vigilance and eagerness. On the eve of the battle, Darius kept his men armed and ready for battle throughout the night in case Alexander attempted to attack the Persians in the night. While there may have been reason to believe that Alexander, being vastly outnumbered, may have tried such a task, the overnight watch proved to be completely unnecessary (Badian 2000: 259). As a result, the Persian army was probably exhausted during the battle the next morning. Yet despite this fact, the Persian army fought very well, holding most of the Macedonian line at a standstill, and even breaking through in one instance to the Macedonian camp (Devine 1986: 105). However, Alexander and his Companion cavalry proved to turn the momentum in the favor of the Macedonians. Once his cavalry charge broke through the Persian line, Alexander wheeled about immediately to engage Darius. Once again, Darius fled the battlefield just before being met head-on with the Macedonians. Shortly after Darius’ escape, the remainder of the Persian army turned and fled too, resulting in another major victory for Alexander.

A very important aspect of Darius that has not been touched upon yet, despite it being the focus of numerous historians’ indignation for Darius, is the reasoning behind Darius’ flights from the two battles he commanded. Nylander provides the best logical explanation for Darius’ seemingly cowardly actions (149-153). He claims that Darius, as the Persian king, was seen as an almost god-like figure. For him to have died in battle would guarantee the demise of the Persian Empire. Thus, instead of taking the extremely risky endeavor and engage in combat, Darius fled the battle in order for the Persian Empire to proliferate into the future, as small as it may be. Although no historian will ever be able to know what emotions ran through Darius’ mind in the midst of the battles, special consideration must be taken to ensure that Darius is not quickly labeled as a “coward” if his flights may have actually been attempts to keep the Persian Empire intact.

Darius III certainly is not the “poor despot” or “feeblest of men” that both modern and ancient scholars have made him out to be. His campaign strategies were very logical and, if they had succeeded, would have caused serious, possibly debilitating, problems for Alexander. The fact that Darius’ plans for the most part failed, however, does not necessarily prove that Darius himself is a failure. Rather, it exemplifies the type of military leader Alexander was. Darius III was a very good military commander, who was defeated by a great military genius, Alexander of Macedon.

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